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A Dutch return to UN peacekeeping?
Niels van Willigen
ABSTRACT
This article covers the Dutch role in UN peacekeeping. The Netherlands has a
long tradition of political and military involvement in UN peacekeeping. Like
other European countries, its participation decreased considerably from the
end of the 1990s onwards. The Dutch only ‘returned’ in 2014 when they
delivered a substantial number of troops for the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in Mali.
This article starts with putting Dutch participation in UN peacekeeping into an
historical context. It continues with an analysis of the reasons for withdrawal
and subsequently explores the obstacles and opportunities for a structural
return. The article argues that the decision to participate in MINUSMA is
mainly explained by national interests and domestic factors. More in
particular, government coalition politics explains why the Netherlands sent
troops to Mali. In that sense, the Dutch ‘return to UN peacekeeping’ was not
part of a structural change in policy-making, but depended for a large part on
domestic political dynamics.
1. Introduction
The Dutch decision to send 450 troops to Mali as part of the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is
considered one of the signs that European countries are returning to UN
peacekeeping.1 As Koops and Tercovich argue in this special volume, like
many other European countries (including Denmark, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the UK).2 The Netherlands decreased
its participation in UN missions after several dramatic peacekeeping failures
in the 1990s. The last substantial military contribution of the Netherlands was
to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE, 2000–08) from 2000 to
2001. The Netherlands only returned to UN peacekeeping over ten years later
when it deployed troops to MINUSMA. This article analyses the main drivers
of Dutch foreign policy towards UN peacekeeping. It assesses the withdrawal
and return of the Netherlands to UN peacekeeping and makes the argument
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that MINUSMA cannot be seen as a turning point. Instead, the article argues
that the decision to participate in MINUSMA is mainly explained by national
interests and domestic factors. More in particular, government coalition poli-
tics explains why the Netherlands sent troops to Mali. In that sense, the Dutch
‘return to UN peacekeeping’ was not part of a structural change in policy-
making, but depended on a particular domestic political configuration.
Based on an historical overview of Dutch participation in UN peacekeep-
ing, the argument is made that the Netherlands has always adopted an instru-
mental approach towards participation in UN peacekeeping. In the ColdWar,
the decision to participate was primarily informed by national interests.
National interests still play an important role, but in the 1990s, domestic poli-
tics became more important in determining Dutch participation in UN peace-
keeping. Since the 1960s much has been written on the domestic constraints of
foreign policy making. Legislatures, public opinion, organized interest groups,
the media, bureaucracies, and political parties all influence (and often con-
strain) the foreign policy of states.3 Recently, more attention is given to
foreign policy making by coalition governments.4 The assumption behind
the coalition government foreign policy research agenda is that coalition gov-
ernments differ from single-party governments and can therefore be expected
to behave differently when it comes to foreign policy making. One of the
empirical findings is that coalition governments tend to be more extreme in
their foreign policy choices.5 This article does not explicitly seek to offer a
theoretical contribution to this literature, but aims to analyse Dutch policy
towards UN peace operations from the perspective of national interests and
domestic politics in which coalition government plays an important role.
In Section 2, the article places the ‘withdrawal from’ and ‘return to UN
peacekeeping’ into an historical perspective. The section discusses the
Dutch contributions to UN peacekeeping from 1947 until 2015. It shows
that the Netherlands has never been a consistent troop provider to the UN
and that there have been earlier periods of withdrawal and return, which
were mainly motivated by national interests. Section 3 analyses the reasons
for withdrawal after the UNMEE mission. Particular attention is given to
the Dutch participation in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPRO-
FOR) in Bosnia. The Srebrenica disaster (see below) became a watershed in
Dutch thinking about participation in military operations in general and
UN peace operations more in particular. The Dutch parliament became
more involved in decision-making about military operations and domestic
3Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, chap. 5.
4Kaarbo, “Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making”; Kaarbo and Beasley, “Taking It to the
Extreme”; Kaarbo, Coalition Politics and Cabinet Decision Making; Oppermann and Brummer, “Patterns of
Junior Partner Influence on the Foreign Policy of Coalition Governments”; Oktay, “Constraining or
Enabling?”
5Kaarbo and Beasley, “Taking It to the Extreme”; Kaarbo, Coalition Politics and Cabinet Decision Making.
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politics became a more important factor in deciding foreign policy choices.
The section also discusses the role of the European Union (EU), the Organ-
ization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization (NATO) as alternative security organizations that
carry out peacekeeping tasks. The question is posed how these other insti-
tutions affect the Dutch commitment to UN peacekeeping. Section 4 elabor-
ates on obstacles to a Dutch return to UN peacekeeping. It discusses problems
with the ‘return to peacekeeping’ thesis in relation to the Netherlands. Section
5 elaborates on positive indicators for a Dutch return. It addresses the ques-
tion under which conditions the Dutch foreign policy elite might recommit to
UN peacekeeping. More in particular the Dutch participation in Mali is dis-
cussed. The concluding section presents a reflection on the results of the
analysis and suggests ways forward regarding the effort to increase European
participation in UN peacekeeping.
2. Historical evolution
The Netherlands has a long tradition of political and military involvement in
UN peacekeeping. On the one hand, there is a clear interest for the Nether-
lands to participate in and contribute to UN peacekeeping. As a medium-
sized European country the Dutch government needs multilateral institutions
to advance its interests and values and the UN is an obvious forum to do so.
Also, international peace and stability is of crucial importance for a trading
nation like the Netherlands. A recent evaluation of the Dutch foreign policy
strategy rightly noted that ‘Few other countries are as closely interwoven pol-
itically, economically and socially with the world around us.’6 When discuss-
ing a decision to deploy troops abroad in parliament, the Dutch government
often goes at lengths to explain that peacekeeping is in the interest of the
Netherlands.7 The most straightforward argument is often that participation
in a particular peace operation contributes to stability in the region. In the
case of MINUSMA, for example, the Netherlands argued that participation
in the mission would serve Dutch interests, because the mission aims to
create stability in a country close to the external border of the European
Union.8 In a talk show on national Dutch television, the Minister of
Defence warned that an unstable Mali would disrupt trade routes, endanger
the access to raw materials, and allow human trafficking.9 Next to the
effects that (successful) peacekeeping has on the material interests of the
Netherlands, the argument is also often made that participation in peacekeep-
ing has a positive effect on the influence that the Netherlands has on
6Scientific Council For Government Policy, Attached to the World, 11.
7Den Ridder, Dekker, and Van Houwelingen, COB Kwartaalbericht 2011/2, 35.
8Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Artikel 100 brief MINUSMA.
9De Boer, “VVD en PvdA sluiten deal: meedoen in Syrië en langer in Mali.”
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international politics.10 In that respect, participation is seen as a way to earn a
place at the table. In 2009, for example, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
made this link explicit by claiming that because the Netherlands contributed
significantly to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan,
it was granted the opportunity to organize the Afghanistan donor conference
in 2009. The Ministry assessed that as a result of the influence of the Nether-
lands on the world stage got a substantial boost.11 As will be explained below,
the international political benefits that might result from participation in
peacekeeping also played a role in the Dutch decision to participate in
MINUSMA. That decision was taken at the time when the Netherlands
started campaigning for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council
(UNSC) for 2017–19.
The political and economic interest in international stability explains why
the constitution of the Netherlands includes the promotion of the inter-
national rule of law as one of the core tasks of the Dutch armed forces.12
Apart from the observation that the article promotes Dutch political and
economic interests it can also be seen as the institutionalization of the
Dutch foreign policy tradition of ‘internationalist idealism’.13 In debates
about deploying peace operations, the government often refers to the Dutch
commitment to multilateralism, human rights, international peace and secur-
ity, and the international rule of law. In the MINUSMA case, the Dutch gov-
ernment explicitly mentioned ‘solidarity’ with the people in Mali as an
important motivation to participate.14 However, it would be wrong to
assume that idealist motivations are disconnected from interest-based motiv-
ations. In the case of peacekeeping, state participation is often driven by
national interests.15 As is shown in Section 2, this is also the case for the Neth-
erlands. From the early days of UN peacekeeping on, the Netherlands adopted
a rather instrumental approach towards UN peacekeeping. Idealist motiv-
ations were coupled to interest-based considerations. This is among others
illustrated by the Dutch proactive public diplomacy, which brands The
Hague as the third UN city (after New York and Geneva) and the world’s
capital of international justice (because of the many international legal organ-
izations based there). On the one hand, this branding exercise can be seen as
an expression of idealism, on the other hand being an important host for UN
organizations also brings real economic and political benefits.
Given that the Netherlands is a co-founder of the UN, that there are econ-
omic and political interests involved, and that the foreign policy tradition of
10Hellema, Nederland in De Wereld, 364.
11Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Buiten-
landse Zaken, 13.
12Kingdom of The Netherlands, Constitution, Article 97.
13Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles.
14Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Artikel 100 brief MINUSMA.
15Neack, “UN Peace-keeping.”
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internationalist idealism fits well into the idea of UN peacekeeping, one would
suspect that the Netherlands is willing to participate substantially in UN
peacekeeping on a structural basis. However, that has never been the case.
From the outset, most of the Dutch contributions to UN peacekeeping were
rather small. During the Cold War era (1945–90), the Netherlands made
one large military contribution to UN peacekeeping, which was to the UN
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1979–85). Admittedly, the Dutch also
contributed a large number of troops to the Korean War (1950–53).
However, the Korean war cannot be considered a proper peacekeeping
mission. At best it could qualify as a peace enforcement mission as it was a
United States (USA) led coalition of the willing, mandated by the UNSC.
Therefore, UNIFIL was the first substantial Dutch contribution to a UN
peacekeeping operation.16 Between 1979 and 1985, the Netherlands in total
sent 9,084 troops to serve in UNIFIL.17 This was twice the number of
troops it contributed to the Korean War and UNIFIL would become the
largest Dutch mission during the entire Cold War era. It was a complex
and risky mission. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt moral pressure
to participate, because the Netherlands had offered to make troops available
for the UN standby forces in the 1960s.18 By 1968 the Netherlands had
become (on paper) the largest supplier of standby forces for UN peacekeep-
ing.19 The existing commitment to the UN made the Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs keen to participate in Lebanon. In spite of practical reser-
vations voiced by the Ministry of Defence and the Dutch armed forces, the
Netherlands decided to send the promised standby force, consisting of the
44 armoured infantry battalion.20 The mission is generally considered to
have at least party failed, mainly due to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in
1982, which UNIFIL could not prevent. In the Netherlands, UNIFIL had
impact in the sense that it led to a very critical review of participation in
the UN standby forces. Nonetheless, rather than ending its participation,
the Netherlands decided to continue to commit troops, but on a less structural
basis. Instead of offering concrete units it would decide on a case-by-case basis
which troops would exactly be send on a peacekeeping mission.21
16Hellema, Nederland in De Wereld, 337.
17Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Historical Missions: UNIFIL.
18The idea of UN standby forces for peacekeeping was initiated by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammersk-
jöld in 1956 in the wake of the UNEF-I mission. In 1963 The Netherlands decided to offer a standby unit
consisting of The Netherlands Marine Corps. This unit was replaced with the 44 Pantserinfanterie Bataljon
(44 Armoured Infantry Battalion) in 1965, which was actually used in UNIFIL. In 1993 the UN introduced a
Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), which is a database with national pledges to provide troops for
UN peacekeeping. See for UNSAS: Alger, The United Nations System.
19Klep and Van Gils, Van Korea Tot Kabul, 61; Hellema, Nederland in De Wereld. De Buitenlandse Politiek Van
Nederland, 364.
20Klep and Van Gils, Van Korea Tot Kabul, 71–3.
21Klep and Van Gils, Van Korea Tot Kosovo, 92.
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After Lebanon the participation in the UN Transition Assistance Group
closed the list of, in total, nine22 Dutch contributions to UN peacekeeping
during the Cold War. Concluding, the Netherlands contributed to UN peace-
keeping, but not as much as could be expected based on its foreign policy tra-
dition of internationalist idealism and the economic and political benefits that
might result from participation. This was mainly because the focus on NATO
and the Atlantic orientation of the Netherlands ensured that fighting the Cold
War got priority over UN peacekeeping. After the Cold War had ended, the
Netherlands provided a significant number of troops to among others the UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia and the UNPROFOR in Bosnia. As was
the case with a lot of other European countries, there was a strong increase of
participation in UN peacekeeping in the 1990s. The Netherlands also showed
commitment to UN peacekeeping in other ways. Financially, the Netherlands
belonged to the top 30 contributors in the 1990s.23 Further, the Netherlands
strengthened its commitment to UN peacekeeping by providing troops for
rapid deployment. In the wake of the Rwanda genocide, the Dutch govern-
ment presented the idea of a UN Rapid Deployment Brigade.24 The 1995 pro-
posal proved to be too ambitious mainly because it included the idea of a
volunteer force that could be used without national approval.25 A 1994
Danish initiative on rapid deployment was more successful. It led to the estab-
lishment of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in 1996.
Together with Canada the Netherlands was also one of the driving forces
behind the Danish initiative.26 SHIRBRIG was meant to generate a brigade-
level peacekeeping force, which could be deployed within 30 days and
could remain in the field up to half a year. SHIRBRIG became operational
in 2000 and was used by the Netherlands for the contribution to the
UNMEE mission. This would remain the only operation of SHIRBRIG
until it was dismantled in 2009.
3. Reasons for withdrawal
There are two key explanations for the Dutch withdrawal from UN peace-
keeping after the Netherlands ended its participation in UNMEE in the
summer of 2001: a loss of trust in the UN as an organization that is able to
execute successful peacekeeping operations and increased activity within
NATO, the EU, and ad hoc arrangements. To start with the first explanation,
the loss of trust in UN peacekeeping was the direct result of the peacekeeping
22One of these nine missions (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, UNTSO) is still operational
and the Netherlands is also still contributing.
23Pichat, A UN Legion. Between Utopia and Reality, 152.
24Leurdijk, A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade.
25Pichat, A UN Legion, 158.
26Koops and Varwick, Ten Years of SHIRBRIG, 6.
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failures in the 1990s. In many Western countries, there was a strongly dimin-
ished enthusiasm to participate and ‘UN peacekeeping’ became synonymous
with ‘disaster’. Bosnia (UNPROFOR), Somalia (UNISOM), and Rwanda
(UNAMIR) failed due to serious organizational shortcomings, including the
lack of ‘appropriate mandates, information, political support, troops,
resources and guidance’.27 For the Netherlands in particular, the mission in
Bosnia proved to be a catastrophe. In 1993 the Dutch government dispatched
an airborne battalion (named ‘Dutchbat’) of 1,100 troops to the Bosnian
enclave Srebrenica.28 Together with five other sites, Srebrenica had been
denominated a ‘safe area’ by the UN. This could not prevent the enclave
being overrun by Bosnian Serb forces in July 1995. Approximately 8,000 civi-
lians (mostly men and boys) were killed.29 The fall of the enclave had deep
political impact. It led (quite late, but still) to the collapse of the Dutch gov-
ernment coalition in 2002. Many studies have appeared trying to explain the
failure. The most important explanations are a weak mandate, too lightly
armed forces, and lack of political and military support from Allies. A
recent study by former Defence Minister Voorhoeve claims that the USA,
France, and the UK did not deliver the air support requested by the Dutch,
because they consciously gave up the area to the Bosnian Serbs.30 Apart
from international politics, one of the most important factors leading to the
disaster was the domestic decision-making process. The government had a
strong desire to act, which led to the neglect of factors that pointed to the
huge military challenges in case the enclave had to be defended.
The Srebrenica disaster had a lasting impact on Dutch thinking about mili-
tary interventions in general and UN peacekeeping more in particular. Several
inquiries took place, which showed that the decision-making process on mili-
tary interventions needed to be revised. In the process, the role of Dutch par-
liament increased. The most important development in that respect was the
article 100 procedure. The procedure refers to article 100 of the Dutch consti-
tution, which obliges the government to inform parliament prior to any peace
operation. Although formal approval of parliament is not required, there have
been no peacekeeping missions decided upon without support of the majority
in parliament. Parliament gained a de facto decision-making authority. A
second important development was the establishment of the Assessment Fra-
mework (Toetsingskader) in 1995. In 2001 the Assessment Framework was
further refined and included the new article 100 procedure. The Assessment
Framework was meant to structure the deliberations between government and
parliament and to improve the quality of decision-making on military
27Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, 119.
28Hellema, Dutch Foreign Policy, 334.
29Bosnian Institute, “Bosnian Serbs Issue Apology for Massacre”; International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, The Conflicts.
30Voorhoeve, Veilige gebieden.
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interventions. The Assessment Framework consists of several criteria against
which the decision to participate is checked.31
One criterion, for example, is that the Netherlands should only participate
in military missions if there are reliable partners. This should ensure the pol-
itical and military back up which was missing in Bosnia. A second example
is the large attention for the military aspects of feasibility. When the Dutch
government decided to send troops to Srebrenica, the military feasibility (or
actually the lack thereof) was largely ignored. The criterion of military feasi-
bility strongly impacted the way the Dutch government participates in UN
peacekeeping since 1995. One important element of military feasibility is
escalation dominance, ensuring that the troops can outgun their adversaries
during the entire escalation ladder. This led, for example, to the decision to
deploy four Apache attack helicopters to the UNMEE mission. Although
UNMEE had strong characteristics of a classic peacekeeping operation
(implying a low level of violence) parliament urged the Dutch government
to accept the deployment of attack helicopters, just in case. Initially, the gov-
ernment declined and the military chief of staff voiced that he would prefer
transport capacity instead. Nonetheless, in order to gain support for the
mission the government complied with the parliamentary demand.32 A
second demand related to force protection in the UNMEE mission was
that the government was asked to get guarantees from large countries (i.e.
the USA and France) to help Dutch troops in case things would go
wrong. Also in this case parliament got its way: both France and the USA
were included in the contingency planning.33 A similar discussion took
place in 2013–14 during the decision-making process on participation in
MINUSMA. Parliament forced the government to dispatch Chinook trans-
port helicopters. The governments first held the position that these were
not needed since contributing European allies would guarantee this trans-
port capacity. Parliament, however, was unconvinced that this arrangement
would lead to timely evacuation or medical assistance in case of an accident
or violent confrontation.34
The failed Dutchbat mission and the subsequent reflection on peacekeep-
ing led not only to a review of the decision-making process, but also to the
conclusion that the UN is not the most effective organization for carrying
out (complex) peacekeeping. That alone will to a large extent explain the
Dutch withdrawal. However, the withdrawal was further strengthened by
the emergence of alternatives for military force deployment. This is explained
by institutional choice theory. Juppile et al. posit that although there is a status
31After an earlier update in 2009, the most recent version of the Toetsingskader is from 2014, at: https://
zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/29521/kst-29521-226.html.
32de Volkskrant, “Apaches voor de vorm mee naar Eritrea.”
33Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Eindevaluatie UNMEE.
34Trouw, “Toch helikopters met missie mee naar Mali.”
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quo bias, states decide to cooperate in alternative institutions when the ‘focal
institution’ (in this case the UN) cannot do the job properly.35 First, NATO
became an alternative for the UN in relation to crisis management.
NATO’s involvement in European and international security affairs already
increased half way the 1990s when it executed two air campaigns in Bosnia
(operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force). In 1999 the NATO led and
executed air strikes in Kosovo and Serbia (Allied Force, 1999). The Dutch
contributed with 744 troops (air force) between March and June 1999.36 Sub-
sequently, with 4,179 troops it was also a large contributor to NATO’s Kosovo
Force (KFOR), which had been created in order to stabilize Kosovo after the
air strikes had ended.37 Second, the Netherlands delivered troops to three
large multinational operations. In Afghanistan it provided 21.237 troops
from 2001 to present to ISAF, which started out as an operation under rotat-
ing command before NATO took the lead in 2003.38 And in Iraq the Nether-
lands contributed to the Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR). SFIR was a
multinational force under command of the USA and was mandated by the
UNSC. Between 2003 and 2005 the Netherlands participated in SFIR with
7,568 troops. The third multinational operation was Enduring Freedom.
Enduring Freedom was initiated after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and was
led by the USA. From 2001 to present the Netherlands participated with
4,056 troops.39 Next to NATO and ad hoc multinational operations, the Neth-
erlands committed itself to the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) of the EU. In the 2000s there was not only a strong impetus to
strengthen the CFSP, but also to develop the Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP). That led to several CSDP-missions to which the
Netherlands also contributed.
Concluding one can say that next to the disillusion with the UN peacekeep-
ing system the Netherlands withdrew because of competing arrangements,
whether NATO, ad-hoc arrangements, or the EU. The choice for alternative
arrangements (mainly NATO and the EU) does not only depend on an assess-
ment of the extent to which the organization can successfully execute peace-
keeping tasks, but also on the strategic priorities in Dutch foreign policy.
National political and strategic priorities can become impediments to partici-
pation in UN peacekeeping when they are not in line with the UN’s
priorities.40
35Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal, Institutional Choice and Global Commerce.
36Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Historical Missions: Allied Force.
37Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Historical Missions: KFOR.
38Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Historical Missions: ISAF.
39Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Historical Missions: Enduring Freedom.
40Bellamy and Williams, “Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions,” 419.
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4. Obstacles for return to UN peacekeeping
The withdrawal in the 2000s was motivated primarily by the peacekeeping
disasters in the 1990s and the resulting lack of trust in UN peacekeeping.
That alone is already a major obstacle for return. Policy-makers within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence still regard UN peace-
keeping as a risky endeavour due to the general lack of unity of culture and
unity of purpose in these missions.41 Secondly, the alternative arrangements
continue to form an impediment. Even more so since in the last five years,
the EU and NATO have increased in importance as European security provi-
ders. Instability at the EU’s borders and the resulting demand for increased
deterrence (in reaction to the Ukraine crises) and robust military operations
(for example, Libya in 2011) draws attention in European capitals away from
UN peacekeeping. Unless the operation serves Europe’s security interests, as is
the case with MINUSMA.42
As was pointed out above, the Netherlands has an instrumental approach
towards UN peacekeeping. There is no explicit policy that dictates that UN
missions get priority over other international institutions such as those of
the EU or NATO. Current policy offers a menu of choice as far as the possible
vehicles for peace operations are concerned. The International Security Strat-
egy (2013), the Defence White Paper (2013) and the International Security
Policy Brief (2014) provide the policy guidelines for current Dutch military
and policy deployment.43 The documents iterate the long-standing practice
that NATO is the cornerstone of Dutch security. They mention the EU and
the OSCE as the other two main security institutions that help the Nether-
lands attain its foreign policy goals. UN peacekeeping is not mentioned at
all in any of the documents and the UN is referred to mainly in the context
of the legitimatizing role of the UNSC. The lack of attention to UN peacekeep-
ing in the policy documents corresponds with the current focus on NATO
and the EU as vehicles for crisis management. In 2015, even with the large
contribution to MINUSMA, military and police deployment within the
context of EU and NATO operations was significant; in total about 800
police officers, experts, and troops were deployed under the flag of NATO,
EU, OSCE, and Other, whereas the peak number of Dutch UN peacekeepers
was 750.44
The qualification of the Dutch return to UN peacekeeping heavily depends
on the MINUSMA case. MINUSMA illustrates very well the instrumental
Dutch approach towards participation in UN peacekeeping. In that respect,
41Author interview with official from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mar. 2016.
42Author interview with official from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mar. 2016.
43Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Veilige Wereld; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beleids-
brief Internationale Veiligheid.
44Data from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNDPKO.
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it is important to note that it is somewhat coincidental that the Dutch pres-
ence in Mali takes place under the UN flag. The contribution to the UN
only came about after two attempts had failed to provide troops as part of
the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) in Mali.45 Thus, up to a certain
point the Dutch contribution to the UN came about as the result of the
failure to participate within the context of the EU. The failure to contribute
to EUTM and the eventual contribution to MINUSMA is explained by
both domestic factors and national interests. Within the new Dutch govern-
ment coalition of 2012 the social democrats (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA)
pushed for a participation in Africa. Participating in a UN mission in
Africa with an emphasis on development was a long-standing wish of the
social democrats. The liberal conservative party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid
en Democratie, VVD) in contrast, has a default preference for NATO as the
organization in which crisis management operations should take place.
Behind these different viewpoints lies a difference of opinion about whether
the deployment of Dutch troops should mainly be motivated by the develop-
ment agenda (the preference of the social democrats) or the security agenda
(the preference of the liberal conservatives).46 When it became clear in the
spring of 2013 that the EU would become active in Mali, the social democrats
pushed for participation. The liberal conservatives however, had strong objec-
tions. The resulting lack of consensus led to almost six months of indecision.
Having failed twice to create consensus on the EU mission, the social
democrats succeeded in convincing the liberal conservatives to participate
in MINUSMA. In that respect, it helped that the Dutch social democrat
Bert Koenders was heading the MINUSMAmission as the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral’s Special Representative. Koenders was the long-standing foreign policy
spokesperson of the social democrats in parliament. From 2007 to 2010 he
was the minister for development and before he became the Special Represen-
tative in Mali, he led the UN mission in Ivory Coast from 2011 to 2013.
During his career Africa played an important role.47 As Special Representative
in Mali, Koenders lobbied strongly in favour of Dutch participation. It also
helped that the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frans Timmermans, was
a social democrat too. Moreover, the two failed attempts to contribute to
EUTM had damaged the Dutch image within the EU, especially in Brussels
and Paris. The PvdA could convince the VVD that by offering a substantial
number of troops that were mandated to carry out crucial tasks for
MINUSMA, the Netherlands would be able to regain its international stand-
ing as a reliable partner.48 This was even more important in the light of the
45Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Beantwoording Kamervragen over een eventuele bijdrage van
Nederland aan de EU trainingsmissie in Mali.”
46Bergers, “PvdA wil vaker meedoen aan vredesmissies.”
47Van Outeren and Kranenburg, “De woelige wereld van Bert Koenders.”
48Hoedeman and Righton, “Kabinet overweegt forse militaire bijdrage Mali.”
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Dutch campaign for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC in 2017–19. It is gen-
erally recognized that active participation in UN activities helps increase the
odds for any country that aims for the non-permanent membership the Secur-
ity Council. Both the large Dutch and Swedish contributions to the mission
are connected to the countries’ ambitions to occupy the non-permanent
UNSC seat in the Western European and Others regional group.49
In spite of this compelling national interest, Dutch participation in
MINUSMA was mainly subject to domestic politics. Especially coalition
party politics played an important role in the extension of the mandate. In
June 2015 the coalition decided to extend the participation in MINUSMA
with one year (until December 2016). In fact, this decision was coupled to
the extension of the mandate of the Dutch airforce in the anti-IS coalition
in Iraq.50 The liberal conservative party had insisted on continuing that par-
ticular operation, whereas the social democrats wanted to continue partici-
pation in MINUSMA. The MINUSMA case therefore suggests that a
positive Dutch decision about participation in a UN mission can heavily
depend on party political factors. Another domestic factor, which should be
mentioned, is that the participation of the Netherlands in military missions
is co-determined by decreasing defence budgets. Thus, next to reservations
towards UN peacekeeping and the presence of alternative arrangements,
domestic factors (party politics in particular) can play an important limiting
role in the decision-making process on participation in UN peacekeeping.
5. Opportunities for a return to UN peacekeeping
In spite of the limiting factors elaborated upon above, the Dutch government
decided to contribute substantially to MINUSMA. Moreover, the Netherlands
was one of the driving forces behind US President’s Obama’s pledging summit
during the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2015. The year before
the USA initiated a process to involve more European countries in UN peace-
keeping, mainly because these countries can provide high-quality contri-
butions. In preparation for the September 2015 summit the Netherlands
was asked to organize a regional conference in Europe.51 The conference
‘Delivering Peace and Protection: the Convening Power of UN Peace Oper-
ations’ took place on 16 and 17 February 2015. Over 40 European countries
discussed in what ways European countries can contribute more and more
efficiently to UN peace operations. Next to that policy dimension the confer-
ence was also used to collect pledges for contributions. During the September
49Vermeulen, “Waarom gaan er Nederlandse soldaten naar Mali.” Van Outeren, “Een Afrikaanse misse in
een Afrikaans tempo.”
50Van der Veen, “Nederland verlengt militaire missie in Mali en Irak.”
51The other regional conferences took place in Ethiopia (for Africa), in Guatemala (for Latin America) and in
Indonesia (for Asia). Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, “Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg,” 11.
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summit several pledges were communicated. The Netherlands announced its
support for developing a training module for the protection of civilians and
announced the organization of an expert meeting on intelligence sharing in
UN missions. The Netherlands also committed to a financial contribution
to Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) strategic planning cell.
Notwithstanding the value of these smaller contributions, the main pledge
of the Netherlands was the decision to extend the mandate of its troops in
MINUSMA with one year (until end of 2016).52 Following the logic of insti-
tutional choice theory, the extent to which MINUSMA becomes a success
from the perspective of the Netherlands, defines the chances for future mili-
tary commitment to UN peace operations. The failures in the 1990s made the
Netherlands sceptical about the UN as a peacekeeper, but a success in Mali
could theoretically have the inverse effect. It is therefore important to take
a closer look at the Dutch contribution in Mali.
With 450 troops, the Dutch contingent formed the largest European con-
tribution. In 2015, 14 different European countries provided about 1,087
troops and 32 police officers to MINUSMA.53 The Netherlands not only
deployed a significant number of troops, but it also contributed substantially
in qualitative terms. By providing the UN Special Representative from 2013 to
2014, Special Operations Forces (SOFs), an intelligence unit, three Chinook
and four Apache helicopters, police officers, and civilian experts the Nether-
lands put itself in the heart of the mission. With the exception of the red card
procedure (which allows the highest Dutch officer to veto an assignment given
to Dutch troops), there are no national caveats that limit the operability of the
Dutch troops. At the same time, by providing ten officers to the staff of the
force commander (including the deputy chief of staff of operations) the Neth-
erlands made sure it could influence the military operations directly.54
Next to providing officers to the staff of the force commander, the Nether-
lands also delivered the head of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit
(ASIFU). ASIFU was established together with six European partner
countries, which were Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Norway, and
Sweden.55
It is an innovative approach to intelligence gathering and sharing within
the context of a UN mission. Intelligence gathering and sharing within UN
peace operations is traditionally a weak point.56 Due to the lack of secure
systems of information exchange and a general lack of trust between the
troop-contributing countries, intelligence is always gathered and analysed
52Author interview with official from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mar. 2016.
53Karlsrud and Smit, “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa?,” 3.
54Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Artikel 100 brief MINUSMA.
55Van Dalen, ASIFU.
56United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on
Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People.
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by national contingents and not shared among the participating countries on
a structural basis. With ASIFU, however, the Netherlands took the initiative to
set up a multilateral system to gather and analyse information on behalf of the
mission. It is meant to:
provide fused, relevant timely, actionable and integrated intelligence analysis
based on a comprehensive approach, in support of the Force Commander’s pri-
ority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and MINUSMA force protection, in
order to support all levels of MINUSMA and enable the force to mitigate the
threats to the mission, the threats to the force and identify opportunities for
the mission.57
The Netherlands took the initiative to build the ASIFU concept in reaction
to pull factors on the one hand, and push factors on the other. The pull
factors consisted of a great demand for timely and high-quality intelligence
from the UN.58 MINUSMA is a peacekeeping operation carried out in a dif-
ficult operational environment. The traditional UN approach towards intel-
ligence gathering is insufficient for countering the threats posed by that
environment. There are two main problems with the traditional approach.
First, troop-contributing countries often do not share intelligence on such
a scale as is needed for a successful completion of the mission. Secondly,
if intelligence is shared, it is often used for tactical and operational purposes,
rather than for reaching the objectives of the mission (the strategic objec-
tives).59 That means information is primarily used by the force commander’s
military intelligence staff (U2). The U2 organization is responsible for pro-
viding timely information for UN military operations at the tactical and
operational level. Since there is a large demand for this kind of intelligence,
the Joint Mission Analysis Centre is often also used for these ends, rather
than for providing intelligence to the strategic level, i.e. the UN Special
Representative.60 ASIFU was set up in such a way to avoid both mentioned
problems. One of the important measures in that respect is that the unit is
‘attached to’ rather than ‘placed under’ the command of the sector
headquarters.61
The push factor was the experience generated by the Dutch troops in
Afghanistan. One of the factors that can explain a European return to UN
peacekeeping is that most European countries were engaged in Iraq and or
Afghanistan where they developed expensive capabilities. Also, the Dutch
were proud to have developed a ‘Dutch approach’ of counter insurgency,
although the extent to which the approach is really Dutch and the extent to
which it is a successful strategy is under debate.62 Participating in UN
57As quoted in: Karlsrud and Smit, “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali,” 11.
58Author interview with official from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mar. 2016.
59Author interview with official from the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Mar. 2016.
60Van Dalen, ASIFU.
61Ibid.; Author interview with official from the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, Mar. 2016.
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peacekeeping enables these countries to continue with operational concepts
and capabilities as well as to rationalize and legitimize their existence
against the background of decreasing defence budgets.63 The idea behind
ASIFU was developed in Afghanistan in reaction to the need for ‘intelli-
gence-led activities’.64 It caters for strategic planning rather than tactical or
operational planning, which among others means that military units are
from time to time specifically used to support intelligence gathering. ASIFU
makes use of focused sensors (intelligence units), a multidimensional
approach that studies information from a cross-political, military, economic,
social, infrastructural, and informational (X-PMESII) perspective and centra-
lized command in combination with decentralized implementation.65
Leaving aside the general effectiveness of MINUSMA as a whole, the
ASIFU concept already seems to deliver some pay offs. The UN’s DPKO is
strongly interested in the lessons learned and the Dutch Ministry of
Defence is currently working on a manual.66 Success of ASIFU is important
in the light of studying the return to UN peacekeeping in the sense that, as
mentioned, the degree to which the Mali operation is considered a success
can influence the likelihood of future Dutch participation in UN peacekeep-
ing. A failure might result in a similar withdrawal as took place in the 2000s,
whereas a success might increase the chances of another substantial partici-
pation of the Netherlands in a UN mission.
6. Conclusions
The analysis above shows that the Dutch contributed to UN peacekeeping
since 1947, but not on a very regular basis. The choice for the UN (and any
other organization for that matter) is made on a case-by-case basis. This
instrumental approach means that throughout history instances of substantial
military commitment were followed by total or near absence from UN peace-
keeping. In that sense, the decline or withdrawal in the 2000s and the return in
2014 are not unique. When taking institutional, political and military factors
on the national and international level into account, the conclusion is that
there are serious impediments to a structural Dutch return to UN peacekeep-
ing. First, the foreign policy decision-makers still regard UN peacekeeping as
an activity characterized by many political and bureaucratic problems with a
detrimental effect on the outcomes of the missions. After years of deployment
in Afghanistan under the NATO flag, Dutch peacekeepers in Mali were again
62Moelker, “The Genesis of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Asymmetric Conflicts”; Zaalberg, “The Use and Abuse
of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-Insurgency.”
63Karlsrud and Smit, “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa?,” 3.
64Van Dalen, ASIFU.
65Ibid.
66Author interview with official from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mar. 2016.
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confronted with the logic (or illogic) of UN peacekeeping.67 Second, there are
alternatives which, given the worsening security environment around Europe,
seem to become more and more important. The International Security Strat-
egy defines the European neighbourhood as the most important strategic
region for the Netherlands. That means that the chances of substantial
Dutch participation only increase when an operation would take place in
that specific region (such as is the case with MINUSMA). And third, the
decision-making process on MINUSMA shows that domestic political
factors are a crucial driver of participation. Especially coalition politics deter-
mines for a large part the decision to participate or not to participate. Next to
that, financial constraints do not help in stimulating a Dutch return to UN
peacekeeping.
At the same time, the ASIFU concept gives a reason for optimism. If it
works well and is a success, it could initiate Dutch enthusiasm to help imple-
menting the concept in UN peacekeeping in general. As mentioned, there is
great interest from DPKO in the lessons learned. Successful implementation
of the concept would help to enhance the quality of UN peacekeeping.
Given the relative low defence budgets in Europe, the worsening security
environment and other limiting factors, it is not very likely that Europe will
return to UN peacekeeping with large numbers of boots on the ground.
There seems to be an emerging consensus, however, that Europe could con-
tribute to UN peacekeeping by providing innovative concepts like ASIFU and
niche capacities like SOFs.
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